Rational models of causal induction have been successful in accounting for people's judgments about causal relationships. However, these models have focused on explaining inferences from discrete data of the kind that can be summarized in a 2 2 contingency table. This severely limits the scope of these models, since the world often provides non-binary data. We develop a new rational model of causal induction using continuous dimensions, which aims to diminish the gap between empirical and theoretical approaches and real-world causal induction. This model successfully predicts human judgments from previous studies better than models of discrete causal inference, and outperforms several other plausible models of causal induction with continuous causes in accounting for people's inferences in a new experiment.

Rational models of causal induction have been successful in accounting for people's judgments about the existence of causal relationships. However, these models have focused on explaining inferences from discrete data of the kind that can be summarized in a 2 2 contingency table. This severely limits the scope of these models, since the world often provides non-binary data. We develop a new rational model of causal induction using continuous dimensions, which aims to diminish the gap between empirical and theoretical approaches and real-world causal induction. This model successfully predicts human judgments from previous studies better than models of discrete causal inference, and outperforms several other plausible models of causal induction with continuous causes in accounting for people's inferences in a new experiment.

Inducing causal relationships from observations is a classic problem in machine learning. Most work in causality starts from the premise that the causal variables themselves are observed. However, for AI agents such as robots trying to make sense of their environment, the only observables are low-level variables like pixels in images. To generalize well, an agent must induce high-level variables, particularly those which are causal or are affected by causal variables. A central goal for AI and causality is thus the joint discovery of abstract representations and causal structure. However, we note that existing environments for studying causal induction are poorly suited for this objective because they have complicated task-specific causal graphs which are impossible to manipulate parametrically (e.g., number of nodes, sparsity, causal chain length, etc.). In this work, our goal is to facilitate research in learning representations of high-level variables as well as causal structures among them. In order to systematically probe the ability of methods to identify these variables and structures, we design a suite of benchmarking RL environments. We evaluate various representation learning algorithms from the literature and find that explicitly incorporating structure and modularity in models can help causal induction in model-based reinforcement learning.

Causal induction, i.e., identifying unobservable mechanisms that lead to the observable relations among variables, has played a pivotal role in modern scientific discovery, especially in scenarios with only sparse and limited data. Humans, even young toddlers, can induce causal relationships surprisingly well in various settings despite its notorious difficulty. However, in contrast to the commonplace trait of human cognition is the lack of a diagnostic benchmark to measure causal induction for modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. Therefore, in this work, we introduce the Abstract Causal REasoning (ACRE) dataset for systematic evaluation of current vision systems in causal induction. Motivated by the stream of research on causal discovery in Blicket experiments, we query a visual reasoning system with the following four types of questions in either an independent scenario or an interventional scenario: direct, indirect, screening-off, and backward-blocking, intentionally going beyond the simple strategy of inducing causal relationships by covariation. By analyzing visual reasoning architectures on this testbed, we notice that pure neural models tend towards an associative strategy under their chance-level performance, whereas neuro-symbolic combinations struggle in backward-blocking reasoning. These deficiencies call for future research in models with a more comprehensive capability of causal induction.

For cutting-edge AI researchers looking for clean semantics models to represent the context-specific causal dependencies essential for causal induction, this DeepMind's algorithm encourages you to look at good old-fashioned probability trees. The probability tree diagram is used to represent a probability space. Tree diagrams illustrate a series of independent events or conditional probabilities. The Node on the probability tree diagram represents an event, and it's probability. The root node represents a particular event where probability equals one.

Are you a cutting-edge AI researcher looking for models with clean semantics that can represent the context-specific causal dependencies necessary for causal induction? If so, maybe you should take a look at good old-fashioned probability trees. Probability trees may have been around for decades, but they have received little attention from the AI and ML community. "Probability trees are one of the simplest models of causal generative processes," explains the new DeepMind paper Algorithms for Causal Reasoning in Probability Trees, which the authors say is the first to propose concrete algorithms for causal reasoning in discrete probability trees. Humans naturally learn to reason in large part through inducing causal relationships from our observations, and we do this remarkably well, cognitive scientists say. Even when the data we perceive is sparse and limited, humans can quickly learn causal structures such as interactions between physical objects, observations of the co-occurrence frequencies between causes and effects, etc. Causal induction is also a classic problem in statistics and machine learning.

Rational models of causal induction have been successful in accounting for people's judgments about the existence of causal relationships. However, these models have focused on explaining inferences from discrete data of the kind that can be summarized in a 2 2 contingency table. This severely limits the scope of these models, since the world often provides non-binary data. We develop a new rational model of causal induction using continuous dimensions, which aims to diminish the gap between empirical and theoretical approaches and real-world causal induction. This model successfully predicts human judgments from previous studies better than models of discrete causal inference, and outperforms several other plausible models of causal induction with continuous causes in accounting for people's inferences in a new experiment. Papers published at the Neural Information Processing Systems Conference.

Rational models of causal induction have been successful in accounting for people's judgments about the existence of causal relationships. However, these models have focused on explaining inferences from discrete data of the kind that can be summarized in a 2 ✕ 2 contingency table. This severely limits the scope of these models, since the world often provides non-binary data. We develop a new rational model of causal induction using continuous dimensions, which aims to diminish the gap between empirical and theoretical approaches and real-world causal induction. This model successfully predicts human judgments from previous studies better than models of discrete causal inference, and outperforms several other plausible models of causal induction with continuous causes in accounting for people's inferences in a new experiment.

We use graphical models to explore the question of how people learn simple causal relationships from data. The two leading psychological theories can both be seen as estimating the parameters of a fixed graph. We argue that a complete account of causal induction should also consider how people learn the underlying causal graph structure, and we propose to model this inductive process as a Bayesian inference. Our argument is supported through the discussion of three data sets. 1 Introduction Causality plays a central role in human mental life. Our behavior depends upon our understanding of the causal structure of our environment, and we are remarkably good at inferring causation from mere observation. Constructing formal models of causal induction is currently a major focus of attention in computer science [7], psychology [3,6], and philosophy [5]. This paper attempts to connect these literatures, by framing the debate between two major psychological theories in the computational language of graphical models. We show that existing theories equate human causal induction with maximum likelihood parameter estimation on a fixed graphical structure, and we argue that to fully account for human behavioral data, we must also postulate that people make Bayesian inferences about the underlying causal graph structure itself.

We use graphical models to explore the question of how people learn simple causalrelationships from data. The two leading psychological theories canboth be seen as estimating the parameters of a fixed graph. We argue that a complete account of causal induction should also consider how people learn the underlying causal graph structure, and we propose to model this inductive process as a Bayesian inference. Our argument is supported through the discussion of three data sets. 1 Introduction Causality plays a central role in human mental life. Our behavior depends upon our understanding ofthe causal structure of our environment, and we are remarkably good at inferring causation from mere observation. Constructing formal models of causal induction is currently a major focus of attention in computer science [7], psychology [3,6], and philosophy [5].This paper attempts to connect these literatures, by framing the debate between two major psychological theories in the computational language of graphical models. We show that existing theories equate human causal induction with maximum likelihood parameter estimationon a fixed graphical structure, and we argue that to fully account for human behavioral data, we must also postulate that people make Bayesian inferences about the underlying causal graph structure itself.